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SOME INTERNAL POINTS OF VIEW AND 
THE STUDY OF LAW 
THE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING 
ABOUT LAW, JUDGING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS. By 
James Allan.1 Farnham (Surrey), Ashgate. 2011. Pp. vii + 
202. $124.95. 
Grégoire C. N. Webber2 
INTRODUCTION 
Law establishes reasons for action. Even when the law-
maker does not reproduce moral rules in legal form but instead 
creates new, truly positive laws, legal rules establish reasons for 
action, reasons which ground duties to legislate responsibly and 
to acknowledge and maintain, comply with, and apply positive 
law. These questions and their investigation have long been 
examined by classical natural law theorists, but it is to H.L.A. 
Hart that is owed the reception of law’s relationship to reasons 
into contemporary jurisprudence. Situating reasons for action at 
the heart of jurisprudential inquiry is one of the many 
permanent acquisitions of legal philosophy articulated in The 
Concept of Law.3 
True to his insistence on a non-evaluative methodology for 
the study of law, Hart’s exploration of the relationship of law to 
reasons for action stands at some distance to those reasons. For 
the most part, The Concept of Law reports how persons and 
officials act if they take law as establishing reasons for action, 
but does not press why persons would do so or what those 
reasons are. We are told that to understand the role and place of 
legal rules, we must attend to the “internal aspect” of rules, 
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understood from the “internal point of view” of participants 
within the community of persons whose rules they are. From 
that viewpoint, a rule serves as a “guide” and as a “reason and 
justification” for acting in accordance with it (and for frustrating 
those who do not).4 Hart says little about those reasons and his 
sometime insistence that “acceptance” is what arbitrates 
between the internal and non-internal (external) points of view 
seems too weak to communicate the reason-giving quality of law. 
Notwithstanding this, Hart’s focus on the relationship between 
the internal point of view and law’s reasons for action charts a 
path to one’s obligation to follow law and to how obligation 
relates—through reasons for action—to the authority of law. In 
other words, the reason-giving aspect of law sets jurisprudential 
investigation on a course from law-makers (who evaluate and act 
on reasons to create this new law) to law-appliers and law-
enforcers (who maintain the law by understanding and acting in 
accordance with it and the reasons established by it). 
Since the publication of The Concept of Law, studies in the 
philosophy of law have sought better to understand the internal 
point of view and its significance for our legal understanding. 
Many questions surfaced following Hart’s important account, 
questions that continue to animate jurisprudential inquiry, 
including: Does law provide the same reasons for action to 
officials and subjects? Within the class of officials, do legislator, 
judge, and police officer all share the same internal point of 
view? Does a legal rule only provide a reason for action to the 
subject who agrees with its merits? If there are different internal 
points of view, is there reason to attend more to one than to 
another for our understanding of law?5 
For these reasons and others, James Allan’s The Vantage of 
Law: Its Role in Thinking about Law, Judging and Bills of Rights 
is an invitation to situate questions about vantage (synony-
mously: point of law, viewpoint) explicitly at the forefront of 
debates animating the philosophy of law. Allan examines how, 
by attending to different points of view, we might better 
understand certain questions respecting the relationship of 
morality to law, adjudication, and the role and place of bills of 
rights, suggesting that these debates have a different significance 
and salience depending on one’s vantage point. The book begins 
 
 4. Id. at 11 (emphases omitted); see also, e.g., id. at 56, 84, 90, 291. 
 5. A careful overview of some issues with the internal point of view is to be found 
in Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. REV. 
167 (1999). 
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with a disclaimer that the author’s aim is not “to construct an all-
elucidating, philosophically sophisticated theory of law” (p. 1). 
That is true and, perhaps as a result, the invitation of the book to 
attend to different viewpoints is underexplored. That said, 
Allan’s study is a welcome invitation to reflect on some of the 
questions re-introduced to contemporary jurisprudence by Hart 
in 1961. 
I. SOME POINTS OF VIEW 
The title of the book—The Vantage of Law—“intentionally 
alludes to H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law” (p. 1). Allan is 
taken by how Hart’s study of law “shunned adopting the appeal 
court judge’s vantage or perspective—one which is so often the 
implicit vantage or viewpoint in legal writing today” (p. 2). 
Instead, we are told that “up to chapter nine of The Concept of 
Law Hart wrote from the vantage of the outside observer” (p. 
2).6 Like Hart’s The Concept of Law, Allan’s The Vantage of 
Law is “concerned with vantages” (p. 3), and Allan adopts 
different vantages in his journeys into the understanding of law, 
judging, and bills of rights. His orienting ambition is to examine 
the relationship between vantage and understanding: “What 
effect does one’s vantage or perspective or standpoint have on 
how one understands, say, the desirability of a bill of rights or 
the best way for judges to decide cases or whether law is—and 
whether it should be—separate from morality?” (p. 4). The 
question is important and some jurisprudential and much 
constitutional-theoretical debate has been burdened by insuf-
ficient attention to its importance.7 
The definite article in the book’s title is misleading, for 
Allan does not seek to identify the vantage of law but rather 
seeks to examine different vantages for understanding law, none 
of which he situates as central or focal—as the vantage. Rather, 
the introductory chapter charts three “primary vantages,” two 
“ancillary vantages,” and four “even more peripheral or 
ancillary vantages” (pp. 5-6). Let us begin, as does Allan, with 
the category of primary vantages. Here the reader is introduced 
to the concerned citizen, identified as “the person who has a 
stake in the legal system in which he or she lives” (p. 5). 
 
 6. For reasons developed below (as well as others not here tackled), there is 
reason to question this claim. 
 7. For a recent study of methodological questions in constitutional theory, see 
N.W. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE ch. 1 (2010). 
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Unfortunately, “stake” is an ambiguous term and Allan nowhere 
elaborates on its meaning, leaving this vantage to range, in the 
mind of the reader, from self-interest to the prospect of 
something more significant. We are told that the concerned 
citizen is “the average citizen”: “neither morally perfect nor 
immorally wicked nor even amorally indifferent,” of “limited 
(but by no means insignificant) altruism and sympathy,” and 
someone “who in the vast preponderance of circumstances is law 
abiding” (p. 5). 
Without further accounting for this first viewpoint, Allan 
introduces his reader to the second primary vantage: the judge, 
who “normally” can be taken to be on “an appeal court, if not on 
the highest court of the jurisdiction” (p. 5). Significantly for 
Allan, “the judge’s opinion on what should be the case can 
become what is the case” and this is in “marked contrast to the 
concerned citizen” (p. 5, emphasis added). Finally, the 
Holmesian Bad Man rounds off the list of “primary vantages.”8 
He is “the amoral actor whose decisions, choices and motiva-
tions are unaffected by morality” and “indifferent to the claims 
of morality per se” (p. 5). With some qualification, Allan likens 
the bad man’s vantage to that of “the average client-advising 
lawyer” (p. 6). 
We are introduced to the category of “ancillary vantages” 
with the visiting Martian, a somewhat imaginative label for “the 
descriptive sociologist, the outside observer,” being a “non-
citizen with no stake in what is being observed and described 
other than, perhaps, a desire for accuracy and clarity” (p. 6). 
Now, for reasons we will explore below, one should query 
whether this vantage should be awarded any pride of place in a 
book devoted to deepening our understanding of law. Why? 
Because unless Allan purports to be and to report what it is to 
be a judge, bad man, and an average citizen, his journey into 
these vantages will be undertaken from the vantage of a 
“descriptive sociologist” and “outside observer.” This “vantage” 
is significant only for how it attends to how participants in the 
legal system relate to law. What is the viewpoint of the 
descriptive sociologist untethered from the viewpoints of 
participants? What does it describe or observe if not one or a 
combination of the participants’ viewpoints and interactions? In 
this light, sitting uneasily alongside the visiting Martian in the 
category of “ancillary vantages” is one such participant 
 
 8. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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viewpoint: the legislator or law maker, being the “person [who], 
as part of the group of all other legislators of some assembly, can 
turn policy options into law” (p. 6). Little more is said to 
introduce the reader to these two ancillary vantages before 
turning to the “even more peripheral or ancillary vantages” of 
the Omniscient Being, the Moral Philosopher, the Sanctimonious 
Man, and the Law Professor (p. 6). 
Given Allan’s want to track Hart’s methodology, there are 
important omissions in his discussion of viewpoints willingly 
pursued in the shadow of The Concept of Law. Among them: at 
no point does Allan mention, let alone engage with, the internal 
and external points of view so central to Hart’s jurisprudential 
explanation of vantage. Indeed, Allan fails to highlight how, 
even if Hart “wrote from the vantage of the outside observer” 
(p. 2), it was an outsider’s viewpoint insistent on how, to 
understand law and the normative vocabulary employed by legal 
participants, one must attend to the internal point of view. The 
only reference in Allan’s study to Hart’s internal point of view 
occurs late into chapter 1 and consists of the following short 
discussion: 
Recall that he [Hart] tells the reader that people (or rather 
some people) in a functioning legal system have an internal 
point of view, a critical reflective attitude, about the law and 
its rules; they feel obliged to carry out its prescriptions; there is, 
to put it differently, an internal aspect to legal (and indeed 
other social) rules that operates in the minds of (most, or at 
any rate some, of) the individuals in the particular legal 
system. (p. 36, emphasis added) 
The italicized sentence betrays Hart’s explanation of the 
internal point of view. It will be recalled that Hart, as early as in 
the preface to The Concept of Law, insists on the difference 
between “being obliged” and “having an obligation,” likening 
the former to “the beliefs and motives with which an action is 
done” and the latter to “duty.”9 In Hart’s example of the 
gunman situation, I am “being obliged” to hand over my money 
when the gunman threatens to shoot me for it and “we should 
misdescribe the situation if we said, on these facts, that I ‘had 
an obligation’ or a ‘duty’ to hand over the money.”10 In turn, 
appeals to my “beliefs and motives” are neither sufficient nor 
necessary “for the truth of a statement that a person had an 
 
 9. HART, supra note 3, at v, 82. 
 10. Id. at 82. 
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obligation to do something.”11 On Hart’s account, “to feel 
obliged and to have an obligation are different,” even if they 
may be “frequently concomitant.”12 The difference lies in the 
reasons for action provided by one’s obligation. To liken duty to 
feelings of compulsion (as does Allan: “they feel obliged . . .”) is 
to miss Hart’s lesson on how duty relates to rules and rules relate 
to reasons for action, reasons that obtain even if one does not 
feel like complying; indeed, reasons that obtain even when one 
does not comply. 
Possibly as a consequence of inattention to Hart’s internal 
point of view, Allan does not introduce any one of his vantages 
in the frame of the reasons for action established by law. We are 
not told how the concerned citizen or the judge or the legislator 
understands the need to acknowledge, maintain, apply, or make 
law. We are not told, for example, why the concerned citizen is 
“in the vast preponderance of circumstances” law-abiding (p. 5). 
Allan’s various actors are introduced to the reader but their 
relationship to law remains obscure and, throughout the book’s 
discussion, one senses that each actor has a good dose of self-
interest mediating his relationship to law. Perhaps for this 
reason, the bad man’s vantage is the most transparent of all, 
precisely because he denies all but one of law’s reason-giving 
qualities: sanction.13 
The failure to attend to the internal point of view and its 
understanding how law establishes reasons for action leads to 
another omission in the framing of Allan’s project. At no point 
does Allan justify his selection of points of view or his 
willingness to categorize them into the primary, ancillary, and 
more peripheral. The unanswered question of Allan’s entire 
project is: Why select these viewpoints and not others? In turn: 
Why prioritize the viewpoint of the bad man to that of the law-
maker (as the ranking of primary to ancillary suggests)? Why 
pay any attention whatsoever to the viewpoints of the law 
professor and the others identified as “more peripheral”? The 
book’s claim that we might better study our understanding of 
law and debates in legal and constitutional theory by attending 
to different points of view is an important one, but it is frustrated 
by the absence of account why the nine declared points of view 
warrant study and investigation. Stated otherwise and in keeping 
 
 11. Id. at 83. 
 12. Id. at 88 (emphasis in original). 
 13. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 459 (the bad man “cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge of the law enables him to predict”). 
!!!WEBBER-282-ALLANREVIEWINTERNALPOINTSOFVIEW.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2012 2:37 PM 
2012] BOOK REVIEWS 331 
 
with the book’s invitation, Allan fails to articulate from whose 
viewpoint his nine vantages are selected and ranked as more or 
less primary or peripheral and in relation to what. 
The undertaking set by Allan better to understand law by 
attending to different viewpoints never recovers from the 
inattention in the opening chapter to identifying points of view 
and their relationship to law’s reasons for action. Near the 
book’s end, the reader is offered a pathway into Allan’s 
understanding of vantage: he there says that “vantage point can 
simply mean, or be shorthand for, the point of view of the typical 
sort of person holding that job or that outlook or filling that social 
role” (p. 184, emphasis added). This echoes the account of the 
concerned citizen, identified earlier as “the average citizen” (p. 
5). On this framing, the book presents itself, albeit without 
appealing to empirical data,14 as a reporting of what each of the 
average citizen, bad man, judge, legislator, visiting Martian, law 
professor, moral philosopher, etc., think about certain issues. 
But why should anyone accept that an understanding of law can 
be better developed by attending to these pseudo-statistical 
averages? And, even if this method were accepted (as doubtless 
it is for certain other ends), should we accept that there is a 
(single) typical judge or legislator? Even if this generalization 
could be receivable within a single jurisdiction at a given time, is 
there any reason to think that it could be when the range of 
jurisdictions under study includes Zimbabwe, Russia, Canada, 
and “Britain in the eighteenth century” (p. 9)? 
In his introductory chapter, Allan invites study not only of 
different viewpoints, but also of different legal systems. In his 
words, the “importance of vantage or perspective or standpoint 
in understanding legal debates . . . needs also to place those 
vantages in context” (pp. 7–8). Allan appeals to four “contexts” 
and, although he nowhere ranks them in relation to each other 
or appeals to the central case vocabulary casually employed in 
his categorization of points of view as more and less “primary,” 
it is clear that he gives priority to what he “loosely” terms “a 
nice, benevolent, liberal democracy” (p. 8, emphasis added). The 
other three legal systems can be understood to be more or less 
deficient instances of this central instance. Allan’s wicked legal 
system ranges from “Hitleresque or Stalinesque or Maoist 
 
 14. One wonders, for example, how Allan reconciles his statement that “a bill of 
rights will appear least attractive from the Concerned Citizen’s Vantage” (p. 170) with 
successive opinion polls re-affirming popular support for the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.  
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dictatorship[s]” to the “[l]ess brutal[] and lethal[] . . . apartheid 
South Africa-type regime or something along the lines of 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Milosevic’s Serbia” (p. 8). Next is the 
theocratic legal system, where “law is asserted to have an 
explicitly divine origin, and hence for all who accept such 
assertions is by definition wholly moral” (p. 9). Finally, Allan 
appeals to the so-so legal system, being a system where 
“things . . . are noticeably worse than in our nice, benevolent, 
liberal democracy” but where things are, nevertheless, better 
than in wicked legal systems; he lists Russia and Venezuela as 
among the “exemplars” of so-so systems (p. 9). 
As with Allan’s selection of viewpoints, we are not told why 
these four legal systems are important for our understanding of 
law. More fundamentally, we are not told how these four legal 
systems differ beyond the ranking of the benevolent as a more 
central case of a legal system than the so-so, wicked, or 
theocratic systems. Here again, a closer reading of Hart would 
have highlighted the need to clarify what about “nice, 
benevolent, liberal democracies” makes them so, thereby also 
clarifying how the other three legal systems are peripheral 
instances of this one, central system. As Hart explained, 
“sometimes the deviation from the standard case is not a mere 
matter of degree but arises when the standard case is in fact a 
complex of normally concomitant but distinct elements, some 
one or more of which may be lacking in the cases open to 
challenge.”15 Appealing to the different elements that likely 
inform Allan’s benevolent legal system (predominantly just laws, 
a democratic law-maker with primary law-making authority, and 
a commitment to fair and uncorrupted administration), one can 
relate each of his other three systems to that one system in 
different ways: the wicked legal system may differ primarily on 
account of the injustice of many of its positive laws, whereas the 
theocratic system may differ on account of its rule of 
recognition, and the so-so system on account of its imperfect and 
partial commitment to rule by law. However, without further 
accounting for what warrants the pride of place awarded to the 
benevolent legal system in Allan’s scheme, his reader is without 
compass in his travels through these other, less central legal 
systems. 
To provide that compass, Allan would have had to resist his 
want to “place [his nine] vantages in context” (p. 8); that is, in 
 
 15. HART, supra note 3, at 4. 
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the context of his four legal systems. For that manner of 
proceeding gets things precisely backwards: vantage cannot be 
placed in context because context is vantage-dependent. Stated 
less obscurely: Allan’s evaluations of legal systems as benevolent, 
wicked, theocratic, and “so-so” are only possible and intelligible 
from a point of view. Consider, for example, whether Allan’s bad 
man would agree with Allan’s ranking of legal systems if the bad 
man is concerned with law only when and because he judges that 
unpleasant consequences are likely to follow a breach of legal 
rules. For the bad man, perhaps only the so-so legal system 
would be identified as a non-central instance because, from his 
point of view, predictability and clarity and congruence between 
declared rule and administration—“the prediction of the 
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the 
courts”16—are all that matter and, let us suppose, those 
desiderata are satisfied in the benevolent, theocratic, and wicked 
legal systems, but only imperfectly so in the so-so legal system. 
With nine actors and four contexts, the book proceeds to 
examine three debates. Chapters 1 and 2 are devoted to the 
question: “Is it good or desirable to keep separate law and 
morality, ‘law as it happens to be’ and ‘law as it ought to be’?” 
(p. 9). Chapters 3 and 4 “tackle judges and judging” and examine 
“the extent to which we can expect or rely on unelected judges 
to constrain themselves, the appointment of judges, the tensions 
between the demands of certainty and flexibility, the notion of 
the rule of law, the desirability of referring to (and deferring to) 
foreign law, democracy and more” (p. 10). Finally, chapters 5 
and 6 explore bills of rights, including “ways of understanding 
rights, their connection to paternalism, a brief mapping exercise, 
the issue of their interpretation, a digression on statutory bills of 
rights” and, true to the method of the entire book, “how these 
instruments appear from the various vantages” (p. 10). The 
discussion of bills of rights fittingly comes last, as it seeks to tie 
together the discussion of the relationship of law and morality 
and the place and role of adjudication through the prism of 
judicially-enforceable (moral) rights in law. 
The book thus ranges across a number of challenging 
questions. Much could be said of these questions and of Allan’s 
various arguments to answer them, many of which warrant 
careful engagement. But I wish to maintain a focus on the book’s 
primary strength—its invitation to look to vantage in our study 
 
 16. Holmes, supra note 8, at 457. 
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of law, adjudication, and bills of rights—and to situate that 
invitation more generally within the study of law. It is an 
invitation that is lacking in too much of our legal scholarship, 
including—as is one of Allan’s main areas of research—
constitutional theory. To do so, I seek to contrast Allan’s study 
of viewpoint with the project he understood himself to be 
carrying on: Hart’s The Concept of Law. The invitation put to 
the reader in The Vantage of Law would have been all the 
stronger had Allan attended more closely to Hart’s important 
distinction between two points of view as well as some of the 
challenges that burden the distinction. 
II. THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL POINTS OF VIEW 
For Hart, the distinction between the internal and external 
points of view is essential for understanding “the idea of a rule,” 
an idea “without which we cannot hope to elucidate even the 
most elementary forms of law.”17 What is a rule? Hart develops 
his answer by distinguishing between these two points of view. 
From the external viewpoint, an observer may be “content 
merely to record the regularities of observable behaviour in 
which conformity with the rules partly consists”; that observer 
may also record “further regularities, in the form of the hostile 
reaction, reproofs, or punishments, with which deviations from 
the rules are met.”18 However, if the observer “does not give any 
account of the manner in which members of the group who 
accept the rules view their own regular behaviour,” then, Hart 
explains, “his description of their life cannot be in terms of rules 
at all, and so not in the terms of the rule-dependent notions of 
obligation or duty.”19 In other words, the external point of view 
will not be able to capture what a rule is—and, thus, will not be 
able to understand law—unless that viewpoint attends to the 
internal point of view. Without doing so, the observer’s 
description from what Hart labels the “extreme external point of 
view” will only be in terms of “regularities of conduct, 
predictions, probabilities, and signs”—in short, the external 
aspect of rules.20 To understand a rule, one must attend to its 
internal aspect, an aspect manifested by certain observable 
 
 17. HART, supra note 3, at 80. 
 18. Id. at 89. 
 19. Id. (emphases added). 
 20. Id.  
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features noted by the extreme external observer, but not quite 
captured by those features. 
The internal point of view is the viewpoint of the 
participant, the member of a social group. From this viewpoint, 
the regularities of behaviour described by the observer tell but 
part of the story—for the participants who accept a rule, that 
rule is used as a guide to the conduct of social life and as “the 
basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment,” 
all identified by Hart as “the familiar transactions of life 
according to rules.”21 The consequences of that use are what the 
external observer records as the regularities of behaviour, but 
this regularity is not self-moving and to understand the 
observable regularities one must understand why they occur. 
The internal point of view is “the view of those who do not 
merely record and predict behaviour conforming to rules, but 
use the rules as standards for the appraisal of their own and 
others’ behaviour.”22 
At first glance, Hart’s distinction between the external and 
internal points of view might suggest that there are but two such 
viewpoints and that the study of law is confined either to 
reporting regularities of behaviour or assuming the viewpoint of 
a participant—incomplete description or unmediated participa-
tion. It is not so. Hart’s appeal to the qualifier extreme external 
point of view hints at the need to discriminate within the 
external viewpoint. He identifies that from the point of view of 
“an observer who does not accept the rules of the society which 
he is observing,” one may (a) “merely record the regularities of 
behaviour on the part of those who comply with the rules as if 
they were mere habits,” or (b) “record the regular hostile 
reactions to deviations from the usual pattern of behaviour as 
something habitual” in addition to the usual patterns, or (c) in 
addition record “the fact that members of the society accept 
certain rules as standards of behaviour, and that the observable 
behaviour and reactions are regarded by them as required or 
justified by the rules.”23 The third version of the external point of 
view is the most sophisticated and it is the only one that attends 
 
 21. Id. at 90. 
 22. Id. at 98. 
 23. Id. at 291 (emphases in original). For example, consider the following statement 
by Allan with respect to the judge’s vantage, which seems more obviously to fit within 
options (a) or (b) than (c): “judges may only sometimes, not always, be able to elide their 
own personal moral judgments or evaluations into the determination of what counts as 
law” (p. 152). 
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to the internal aspect of rules by reporting, albeit as fact, what 
participants, from the internal point of view, understand as the 
reasons for action established by the rule. 
The point of view appealed to by Hart throughout much of 
The Concept of Law is this third instance of the external point of 
view—that of the “non-participant external observer . . . 
describing the ways in which participants view the law from such 
an internal point of view.”24 In later work, Hart would term this 
the “hermeneutic method,” which “involves portraying rule-
governed behaviour as it appears to its participants.”25 On this 
understanding, the internal point of view is intelligible to the 
observer without himself adopting it, thus charting the promise, 
for Hart and others, of a descriptive, but not incomplete or 
misdirected study of law. Where Hart is perhaps less searching 
than he might have been is in questioning whether the 
hermeneutic method allows the observer to understand law just 
as those with the internal viewpoint understand law. Precisely 
because the observer does not adopt that viewpoint and 
therefore does not understand the rule as a standard for himself, 
he should be alive to the prospect that what “appears” to him as 
fact may not have the same salience for the participants for 
whom “appearance” is at best secondary.26 
On this point, consider the three characteristics of 
obligation identified by Hart, the first one of which he identifies 
as the “general demand for conformity”: “insistent” and “great 
. . . social pressure is brought to bear upon those who deviate”; 
“hostile or critical” disapproval is manifested; those deviating 
feel “shame, remorse, and guilt.”27 What is “important” for Hart-
qua-observer “is that the insistence on importance or seriousness 
of social pressure behind the rules is the primary factor 
determining whether they are thought of as giving rise to 
 
 24. Id. at 242; see also Stephen R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT 311-54 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001). 
 25. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 13 (1983). See 
also NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (2d ed., 2008). 
 26. An important engagement with this question is undertaken in H. Hamner Hill, 
H.L.A. Hart’s Hermeneutic Positivism: On Some Methodological Difficulties in The 
Concept of Law, 3 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 113 (1990). Hill puts the following challenge 
to Hart: “Given that the internal aspect of rules is primarily a psychological fact, Hart 
faces a dilemma. Either this psychological fact can be determined through observation of 
behavior alone . . . or one must adopt the internal point of view and thereby give what 
are, in effect, first person data reports that are then evaluated from a moderate external 
point of view.” Id. at 125. Bix helpfully summarizes this challenge as “the problem of 
knowing other minds.” Bix, supra note 5, at 189. 
 27. HART, supra note 3, at 86. 
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obligations.”28 Now, there is little reason to doubt that this 
characteristic will appear primary to the observer. General 
demands and social pressure and hostile disapproval are 
observable and liable to be reported as facts. But when Hart 
brings into view “two other characteristics of obligation which 
go naturally together” with this first one,29 one is tempted to 
think that observation privileges the observable quality of 
conduct to the reasons why that conduct manifests itself, reasons 
which are less visible and therefore less observable. In other 
words, that what is primary to the observer is at best secondary 
for the participant.30 
For the participant who understands the reasons for action 
established by a rule, the “primary characteristic” of obligation is 
not social pressure but rather the reasons why social pressure 
should be brought to bear on those who deviate from their duty. 
So, when Hart reports from the distance of an observer the 
second characteristic—rules “are thought important because they 
are believed to be necessary to the maintenance of social life or 
some highly prized feature of it”31—one is lead to think that for 
the participants this must be the primary characteristic. Why? 
Because, without it, there is no justification to pressure those 
who deviate from their duty or, in turn, to feel shame, remorse, 
and guilt when one joins the class of deviants. By understanding 
those reasons, one can grasp Hart’s third characteristic of 
obligation more firmly than as (merely) another “characteristic” 
or “factor”: “it is generally recognized that the conduct required 
by these rules may, while benefitting others, conflict with what 
the person who owes the duty may wish to do” and, hence, 
obligation is “thought of as characteristically involving sacrifice 
or renunciation.”32 True, but for the participant, this “third 
characteristic” is what mediates between the first two as the 
bridge between the reasons for action established by the law and 
the need to accompany law with sanction. 
Reformulating Hart’s three characteristics of obligation and 
rule without the strictures of the hermeneutic method, one can 
say that, as a participant who understands the reasons for action 
 
 28. Id. at 87 (second emphasis added). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Here again Allan’s invitation to look to the vantage of the legislator is a 
welcome one: in law-making, the reasons for the proposal-cum-enactment are at the 
forefront of the lawyer’s mind.  
 31. HART, supra note 3, at 87 (emphases added). 
 32. Id. (emphases added). 
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established by a rule, I and others like me establish and maintain 
this rule because we affirm the need for it and the good of it, a 
need and good that is common to us and others. We recognize, 
also, that these reasons for action established for us by the 
promulgation and maintenance of this (our) rule are not the only 
reasons for action intelligible to us and on which we are liable to 
act. We recognize not only the good and the need of this rule for 
us, but also the self-interested want for me not to comply with 
the rule, even if it would benefit you just as your compliance 
benefits me. And because you and I and others like us seek to 
promote the reasons for action established by the rule over these 
other reasons, we supplement the law’s reasons for action—
which each should act on but which we correctly predict not all 
will act on—with secondary reasons for action to motivate those 
in need of further motivation not to deviate from the course of 
action set by our rule: that is, social pressure and sanction.33 
Hart’s want to maintain a descriptive stance in his 
understanding of law means that his account of rules privileges 
what is observable to the reason-giving quality of rules. So, Hart 
seeks out how the internal viewpoint “displays itself” and is 
“manifested,” including in the use of rules “as the basis of 
criticism, and as the justification of demands for conformity, 
social pressure, and punishment.”34 In turn, the reasons for 
action established by rules remain underexplored in The Concept 
of Law. Consider how “acceptance” is the noun commonly 
employed by Hart to account for the internal point of view. We 
know from Hart’s critical review of John Austin’s command 
theory of law that acceptance cannot be reduced to habitual 
obedience or conformity to patterned behaviour based on self-
interest alone (e.g., avoidance of sanctions). However, accept-
ance oscillates in Hart’s usage from the potential richness of a 
“critical reflective attitude”35 to the unreflective and uncritical 
“deference to tradition or the wish to identify with others.”36 On 
 
 33. Hart reasons along these lines, but with different emphasis, when he says: 
“‘Sanctions’ are . . . required not as the normal motive for obedience, but as a guarantee 
that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not . . . . 
Given this standing danger of disobedience by some, what reason demands is voluntary 
co-operation in a coercive system.” Id. at 198 (emphasis in original). Unfortunately, this 
framework is absent from Allan’s study of vantage. 
 34. Id. at 57, 98. Hart speaks of “criticism (including self-criticism), demands for 
conformity, and of acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are justified.” 
Id. at 57. 
 35. Id. at 57. Hart also employs the expression ‘distinctive attitude to that conduct 
as a standard’. Id. at 85. 
 36. Id. at 257. 
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this account, there is a live tension between a critical reflective 
attitude and an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude, just 
as there is a live tension between Hart’s appeal to using a rule as 
a common standard and his inclusion of self-interest as among the 
plausible candidates for acceptance.37 As a result of these 
difficulties and others, if “one is looking for an account of law’s 
normativity that explains its genuine ‘reason-giving’ quality, one 
is bound to be disappointed by Hart’s concept of law.”38 To 
capture law’s reason-giving quality, one must differentiate the 
internal point of view as Hart so successfully differentiated the 
external point of view. And here, Allan’s invitation to look to 
the citizen, the judge, the legislator, and the bad man provide 
some promise for interrogating the internal point of view, 
precisely because one may explore how each participant relates 
to the reasons for action established by law in a somewhat 
different way. 
III. DIFFERENTIATING THE INTERNAL POINT OF 
VIEW 
Hart’s willingness to differentiate the external point of view 
was welcome, for it clarified the central case of the observer’s 
viewpoint for understanding as fact what the participants 
understand as reason. Absent from Hart’s study, however, is a 
similar examination of the internal point of view.39 Hart reports 
the range of reasons-qua-motivations participants will have for 
acting in accordance with law—“calculations of long-term 
interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited 
or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do.”40 
However, beyond reporting this range, Hart does not identify a 
central case of the internal point of view as he had identified the 
hermeneutic method as the central case of the external point of 
view. And yet, because the hermeneutic method is parasitic on 
 
 37. This is carefully charted in Michael A. Wilkinson, Is Law Morally Risky? 
Alienation, Acceptance and Hart’s Concept of Law, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 441, 452, 
455 (2010) . 
 38. Id. at 453; see also JOHN FINNIS, On Hart’s Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact, in 
COLLECTED ESSAYS IV: PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 245–46 (2011); Scott J. Shapiro, What is 
the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1166 (2006); Stephen Perry, Hart 
on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1173–1209 (2006). 
 39. A careful review of the different uses of the internal (and external) point(s) of 
view by Hart is undertaken in Thomas Morawetz, Law as Experience: Theory and the 
Internal Aspect of Law, 52 SMU L. REV. 27 (1999), especially id. at 33–37. 
 40. HART, supra note 3, at 203. 
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the internal viewpoint, this omission explicitly to search out the 
focal meaning of the internal point of view is, perhaps, surprising 
even given the descriptive undertaking Hart set out for himself. 
For, given the range of participant viewpoints out there, which 
one(s) should be selected by the non-extreme external observer? 
Which should be reported? Which best allow(s) us to understand 
and describe law? In other words, “how does the theorist 
decide what is to count as law for the purposes of his 
description?”41 
Although Hart does not discuss which internal point of view 
should be favoured, he can be taken to have shown his reader 
which should be favoured. For in Hart’s study of secondary rules 
he leaves the chair of the observer. He invites his reader to see 
the reasons why one would introduce secondary rules and the 
need for any community of persons larger than “a small 
community closely knit by ties of kinship, common sentiment, 
and belief” to do so.42 Hart identifies—himself and not through 
the mouth of a participant under observation—as defects the 
uncertainty, the static character, and the inefficiency of “the 
simple social structure of primary rules.”43 In turn, he identifies 
how each defect can be “remedied” by “supplementing the 
primary rules of obligation with secondary rules which are rules 
of a different kind.”44 Hart’s discussion outlines reasons why 
communities of persons have reason to choose to create a legal 
system and maintain it; why the rule of recognition gives one 
reason for acting in accordance with the primary rules it 
identifies (for the good of certainty); why rules of change give 
one reason for acknowledging the law-making acts of a 
legislature (for the good of change); and why rules of 
adjudication give one reason to comply with judicial authority 
(for the good of efficiency). Hart’s point of view here is “his, 
yours, and mine, not because they are his, yours, or mine, but 
because it seems true to him, you, and me, that there is value in 
having the rules at stake, reason for having them.”45 This 
 
 41. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 4 (2d ed., 2011). Earlier 
on the same page, Finnis asks: “How, then, is there to be a general descriptive theory of 
these varying particulars?” (emphasis in original). As outlined above, this same question 
burdens Allan’s stipulated, but unexplained selection of viewpoints. 
 42. HART, supra note 3, at 92. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 93, 94. 
 45. John Finnis, Describing Law Normatively, in COLLECTED ESSAYS IV: 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 36 (2011). But note that this is said with respect to: “Of course, he 
Hart begins by saying that, to understand these power-conferring rules (and their 
distinctness from obligation-imposing rules), we must look at them ‘from the point of 
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discussion from the internal point of view confirms what is 
implied throughout Hart’s external-hermeneutic methodology: 
the primacy of the internal point of view which engages with and 
understands the need for, good of, reasons why communities 
should have law. In other words, Hart can be taken to have 
demonstrated what the central case of the internal point of view 
should be: a point of view which understands how law 
establishes reasons for action.46 
Now, it is well known that Hart did not set this task for 
himself and his discussion of secondary rules takes some distance 
from the methodology otherwise employed in his scholarship.47 
Nonetheless, against the standard of evaluation employed in his 
discussion of secondary rules, one can discriminate between 
internal points of view, as Hart had discriminated between 
external points of view. As suggested above, when Hart 
discusses (rather than assumes) the internal point of view, it is 
presented as “an amalgam of very different viewpoints,”48 
ranging from a “critical reflective attitude”49 to mere “deference 
to tradition or the wish to identify with others.”50 These various 
and varied attitudes are shared by those who “accept and 
voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules,”51 which requires 
“the acceptance of the rules as common standards for the group” 
and not merely “the relatively passive matter of the ordinary 
individual acquiescing in the rules by obeying them for his part 
alone.”52 And yet, there is a passivity across the whole range of 
internal points of view reported by Hart: they each and all are 
reported as “maintaining rules that Hart’s account treats as out 
there, available for acceptance and maintenance.”53 This is a less 
fully-developed account of the internal point of view than one 
which explores, as Hart’s discussion of the reasons to transition 
from the pre-legal to the legal world explores, the reasons one 
has to introduce and to choose law. Once chosen and introduced, 
 
view of those who exercise them’.” Id. 
 46. I do not here engage with the questions whether these reasons are conclusive or 
all-things-considered and whether they are, without exception, moral reasons. On the 
latter, see Hart’s discussion of the “minimum content of natural law”: HART, supra note 
3, at 193–200. 
 47. On which, see the careful study in Perry, supra note 24. On the question of 
Hart’s method in introducing secondary rules, see id. at 322–23. 
 48. FINNIS, supra note 41, at 13. 
 49. HART, supra note 3, at 57. 
 50. Id. at 257. 
 51. Id. at 91 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
 53. Finnis, supra note 38, at 240 (original emphasis removed, emphasis added). 
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“rules will of course have to be maintained,” but as Finnis invites 
us to see, this very maintaining, if it attends to the reasons for 
action established by the rules, can be “understood as a kind of 
(re)novation of the making.”54 The reasons for adopting and 
establishing a rule will be (key among) the reasons we have for 
maintaining that rule, a lesson that comes through in Hart’s 
account of the reasons we have for introducing, and therefore 
also for maintaining, rules of recognition, of change, and of 
adjudication. In so maintaining the rules, we can understand 
ourselves to be engaged in “a kind of extending of the law-
making activities of the rulers, an extending by a kind of interior 
personal re-enactment, person by person, of the ruler’s or rulers’ 
legally decisive adoption of their own legislative or other law-
positing proposals.”55 To recall Allan’s various participants, one 
might say that legislator, citizen, and judge jointly participate in 
law if they appeal to the reasons for action identified and acted 
on by the responsible legislator. 
On this account, the internal point of view of the participant 
who understands the reasons why rules should be introduced has 
priority over the more passive participant who maintains rules 
found “out there.” The “practical viewpoint that brings law into 
being as a significantly differentiated type of social order and 
maintains it as such” will be the more central case of the legal 
viewpoint.56 Why? Because with this viewpoint, the reasons for 
action established by law will be central, reasons that 
communities of persons evaluate and engage with when 
determining whether to bring law into being and to maintain it. 
And, tracking Finnis’s account, that viewpoint is the viewpoint 
of those who are practically reasonable, who in deciding and 
choosing what to do, adopting commitments, and acting in 
general understand legal obligation as presumptively a moral 
obligation and the establishment and maintenance of legal order 
as “a moral ideal if not a compelling demand of justice.”57 
My present aim is not to defend that understanding of the 
focal meaning and central case of the internal point of view, but 
rather to argue in favor of doing with the internal viewpoint 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. FINNIS, supra note 41, at 14 (emphasis added). See also John Finnis, Grounds of 
Law and Legal Theory, 12 LEGAL THEORY 315, 335–36 (2007). Throughout, it should be 
recalled that the discussion proceeds on the understanding that one is attending to the 
study of general jurisprudence and not to the study of the law of England and Wales circa 
1961. 
 57. FINNIS, supra note 41, at 14. 
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what Hart did with the external viewpoint: to identify the more 
central from the less central. In so doing and recognizing (as 
Allan recognizes) the different viewpoints that can reasonably 
be identified as internal and thus eligible for observation from 
the external point of view, one can understand the reasons for 
affirming that there is “a mutual though not quite symmetrical 
interdependence between the project of describing human 
affairs . . . and the project of evaluating human options with a 
view, at least remotely, to acting reasonably and well.”58 After 
all, the lesson of Hart’s hermeneutic external point of view is the 
importance of attending to an internal point of view and, given 
that “any given social phenomenon can be accurately described 
in an indefinitely large number of ways,”59 the observer will 
evaluate which participant’s viewpoint, among the near endless 
candidates for observation, will be prioritized for his and our 
understanding of law. 
With the internal point of view thus differentiated, one can 
acquire a better understanding why one and others should 
favour law.60 Understanding how law establishes reasons for 
action means understanding law’s practical point or purpose. 
Another of the permanent acquisitions of jurisprudence 
articulated by Hart was the identification of “the different social 
function which different types of legal rule perform,” evaluated 
against his more general evaluation that law is “used to control, 
to guide, and to plan life out of court.”61 Hart reviewed the 
different functions served by duty-imposing and power-
conferring rules and the remedying functions served by 
secondary rules. Attention to the internal point of view—and 
especially the internal point of view of the practically reasonable 
participant—brings law’s practical point to the surface of 
analysis. For the participant confronts the questions: Why should 
I and we now adopt this rule? Why should I and we now 
maintain the rule then adopted by acknowledging, complying 
with, applying, and enforcing it? Why should we recognize those 
persons with law-making and law-applying authority? The 
 
 58. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
 59. Perry, supra note 24, at 327. 
 60. One could add: defeasibly. That is, this understanding would have to take 
seriously the “moral risk” of alienation from social rules introduced by legal systems. See 
Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1035 (2008); Wilkinson, supra note 37. 
 61. HART, supra note 3, at 38, 40. Compare Hart’s claim in his Postscript: “Like 
other forms of positivism my theory makes no claim to identify the point or purpose of 
law and legal practices as such.” Id. at 248. 
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questions begin with why because they are all oriented to rules 
over which human choice was exercised and, thus, are all 
oriented to the practical point of law. Once that question of 
practical point is firmly held in one’s study of law, one arrives at 
the understanding that law’s multifaceted practical points will 
yield multifaceted judgments about what counts as law, with 
more and less central cases of law.62 The point, viewpoint, and 
focal meaning of law are all deeply interrelated. 
To return to Allan’s nine viewpoints, we might re-organize 
his ranking of primary, ancillary, and even more peripheral 
vantages. If our concern is better to understand how law 
establishes reasons for action, then we might welcome a study 
that situated, as primary, the viewpoints of practically reasonable 
citizens, judges, and legislators. The bad man would rank as a 
diluted instance of the citizen’s viewpoint and one from which 
we could develop but a peripheral understanding of law. Allan’s 
other actors—law professor, moral philosopher, omniscient 
being, and sanctimonious man—might warrant study, but not 
more centrally than our primary participants. And the visiting 
Martian would not be counted among the viewpoints we would 
seek to study: his observer’s perspective would be our own, so 
long as our task was one of seeking to describe how others 
understand the point of law against the reasons for law and, so, 
the more and less central instances of legal systems that realize 
those reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
Allan’s study invites us to pay special attention to who 
speaks on behalf of the internal point of view. The invitation is a 
welcome one and, in this review, I have sought to take that 
invitation seriously and to explore it in the light of Hart’s The 
Concept of Law, being Allan’s declared inspiration. I have 
sought to show how, by attending more closely to Hart’s 
exploration of the internal and external points of view and to the 
pathways for further study and reflection charted by them, Allan 
could have situated law’s reasons for action at the heart of his 
accounts of vantage and legal systems. Despite these 
reservations, Allan’s study is important for the invitation it 
 
 62. This point is forcefully made in Finnis, supra note 45. His challenge in the essay 
is to “the assumption that in relation to human things constituted by human choices, like 
law, you can answer the question ‘What is it?’ before you tackle the question ‘Why 
choose to have it, create it, maintain it, and comply with it?’” Id. at 45 (emphasis added). 
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makes and for its insistence that understanding and point of view 
are more related than we too often care to notice in our study of 
law, judging, and bills of rights. 
 
